A Path to Peace by George J. Mitchell & Alon Sachar

Author:George J. Mitchell & Alon Sachar
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Simon & Schuster

7

OVERCOMING THE TRUST DEFICIT

After he met with Obama, Netanyahu visited the State Department, where Secretary Clinton hosted a small dinner for him and other Israeli officials. The mood was pleasant and upbeat. The discussion focused on the president’s request that the Arab nations take steps toward normalization of relations with Israel as part of his confidence-building measures. Netanyahu spoke at length about the importance of getting some movement from the Saudis, and he asked that the president discuss this issue directly with the king of Saudi Arabia.1 There was no discussion of the president’s request for an Israeli settlement freeze; everyone seemed to assume that the next step would be an initial rejection by Israel, to be followed by intense negotiations.

The rejection came quickly. After returning to Jerusalem, Netanyahu declared, “The demand for a total stop to building is not something that can be justified and I don’t think that anyone here at this table accepts it.”2 Later his spokesman Mark Regev told the press that Israel would not stop settlement activity and would continue to build, but only in existing settlements, a nod to Rabin’s pledge. “We have to allow normal life in those communities to continue,” Regev said.3 Netanyahu’s government “does not accept limitations on building.”4

The press understandably highlighted the negative comments and reported that Netanyahu had publicly “defied” Obama, “setting the stage for friction.”5 The reports created the unfortunate impression that Obama had given Netanyahu an ultimatum. I knew the Israelis would take issue with Obama’s request, and I got a clear indication of the difficulty ahead when Netanyahu’s new minister for strategic affairs, Moshe Ya’alon, said that Israel would not allow the United States to dictate policy: “We won’t let them threaten us.”6 But no one had threatened or intended to threaten Israel. Six years earlier President George W. Bush had made the identical request for a settlement freeze, then went further and assembled a worldwide coalition and a UN Security Council resolution in support of his position. Yet this had not been taken as a threat. Why should the identical request by Obama be interpreted differently?

Within days of Netanyahu’s return to Israel the IDF moved to evacuate an illegal outpost in the West Bank known as Maoz Esther, which consisted of a few shacks on a hilltop. Settlement leaders and the Israeli Right were outraged. The timing created the impression that Netanyahu was responding to a demand from Obama, although that was not the case. Ehud Barak, whom Netanyahu had appointed defense minister, publicly insisted that the timing of the outpost’s removal was coincidental and unrelated to the Obama-Netanyahu meeting. In fact for weeks Barak had been warning of pending outpost removals, explaining that removal was a matter of enforcing Israeli law. But that explanation did not satisfy the settlers and their supporters.

“The Israeli electorate set a clear line for this government,” warned Dani Dayan, head of the Yesha Council.7 Yesha, a Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, represents settlement communities. Dayan not so

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